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ABSTRACT
Machine learning fairness concerns about the biases towards cer-
tain protected or sensitive group of people when addressing the
target tasks. This paper studies the debiasing problem in the context
of image classification tasks. Our data analysis on facial attribute
recognition demonstrates (1) the attribution of model bias from im-
balanced training data distribution and (2) the potential of adversar-
ial examples in balancing data distribution. We are thus motivated
to employ adversarial example to augment the training data for
visual debiasing. Specifically, to ensure the adversarial generaliza-
tion as well as cross-task transferability, we propose to couple the
operations of target task classifier training, bias task classifier train-
ing, and adversarial example generation. The generated adversarial
examples supplement the target task training dataset via balancing
the distribution over bias variables in an online fashion. Results on
simulated and real-world debiasing experiments demonstrate the
effectiveness of the proposed solution in simultaneously improving
model accuracy and fairness. Preliminary experiment on few-shot
learning further shows the potential of adversarial attack-based
pseudo sample generation as alternative solution to make up for
the training data lackage.
CCS CONCEPTS
• Social and professional topics→ Computing / technology
policy; • Applied computing → Law, social and behavioral
sciences; • Computing methodologies→ Machine learning.
KEYWORDS
Fairness in Machine Learning, Responsible Artificial Intelligence,
Adversarial Examples
1 INTRODUCTION
The last few years have witnessed human-level AI in view of ac-
curacy for tasks like image recognition, speech processing and
reading comprehension [13, 22]. The increasing deployment of AI
systems drives researchers to pay attention to other criteria be-
yond accuracy, such as security [28], privacy [5, 27] and fairness,
which are critical for large-scale robust real-world applications [8].
Among these criteria, fairness concerns about the potential dis-
crimination of model towards protected or sensitive groups (e.g.,
gender, skin color). A biased model can lead to unintended social
consequences such as in online advertisement, banking and crim-
inal justice [1, 12, 24], e.g., the popular COMPAS algorithm for
recidivism prediction was found biased against black inmates and
prone to make unfair sentencing decisions [1].
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Figure 1:We propose debiasingmethod that uses adversarial
attacks to balance the data distribution.
Machine learning fairness study involves with two types of vari-
ables: target and biased variables. In the COMPAS example, target
variable is the recidivism label and biased variable is the skin color.
The existing model debiasing attempts can be roughly categorized
according to the intervention period to make the prediction of tar-
get variables independent of the bias variables: (1) Pre-processing
debiasing modifies the training dataset before learning the model.
Typical pre-processing solutions resort to sampling or reweigh-
ing the training samples [7, 15, 30] to make target task model not
learning the correlation between target and bias variables. (2) In-
processing debiasing modifies the standard model learning during
the training process [2, 6]. Adv debiasing is the most popular in-
processing method, which adversarially optimizes between the
target and bias tasks with goal to extract fair representation that
only contributes to the target task [4, 11, 26]. (3) Post-processing
debiasing changes output labels to force fairness after model in-
ference, which enhances outcomes to unprivileged groups and
weakens outcomes to privileged groups. Post-processing solution
is usually employed only when it is difficult to modify training data
or training process [2, 3, 19].
Among the three model debiasing categories, in-processing and
post-processing both compromise between fairness and accuracy
by either imposing additional constraint or explicitly alternating
model outputs. Pre-processing enjoys advantage to address the
intrinsic attribution of model bias in imbalanced training data dis-
tribution, which is widely recognized and further validated in our
data analysis. However, conventional pre-processing debiasing so-
lutions employing sampling and reweighing strategies either fails
to make full use of the training data or only guarantees superfi-
cial data balance. This leads to the reported decreased accuracy in
previous debiasing studies.
The problem thus transfers to how to supplement and balance
the data distribution without damaging the original target task
learning. Adversarial example recently draws massive attention
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regarding model robustness and AI system security [25]. Other
than the endless game between adversarial attack and defense, an
interesting line of related studies observed that model trained on
adversarial examples discovered useful features unrecognizable by
human [14]. This inspires us to employ adversarial examples to
supplement and balance the data distribution for model debiasing.
Specifically, given target task (e.g., predicting the facial attribute of
“arched eyebrow” from image) with imbalanced training set over
bias variables (e.g., much more female than male samples with
“arched eyebrow” annotation), adversarial attack is conducted to
alter the bias variable and construct a balanced training set (illus-
trated in Figure 1). To guarantee the adversarial generalization and
cross-task transferability, we propose an online coupled adversar-
ial attack mechanism to iteratively optimize between target task
training, bias task training and adversarial example generation.
This can be actually regarded as an debiasing attempt between
pre-processing and in-processing, which favorably combines their
both advantages. We summarize our main contributions as follows:
• We propose to employ adversarial examples to balance train-
ing data distribution in the way of data augmentation. Si-
multaneously improved accuracy and fairness are validated
from simulated and real-world debiasing evaluation.
• We provide an online coupled adversarial example genera-
tion mechanism, which ensures both the adversarial gener-
alization and cross-task transferability.
• We explore the potential of adversarial examples as supple-
mentary samples, which provides alternative perspective
of employing adversarial attack and opens up possibility to
addressing data lackage issue from new ways.
2 DATA ANALYSIS AND MOTIVATION
JUSTIFICATION
In this section, we first examine the attribution of model bias in
image classification tasks, and then analyze the potential and chal-
lenges of using adversarial examples to address the model bias
problem.
2.1 Bias Attribution Analysis
Classification bias definition. People can be divided into differ-
ent groups based on their social attributes such as gender, skin color.
Model bias refers to the unfair and unequal treatment of individuals
with certain social attribute, e.g., correlating arched eyebrow more
with female than with male in task of facial attribute prediction.
We use equality of opportunity in this work to evaluate model bias,
where ideal fairness outcome requires that each group of people
have an equal opportunity of correct classification. In terms of
classification tasks, model bias is formally defined as follows:
Definition 1 (Classification Bias 1). We derive the bias of
target task class t ∈ T in a classifier in terms of group difference as:
bias(θ , t)
=|P(tˆ = t |b = 0, t∗ = t) − P(tˆ = t |b = 1, t∗ = t)| (1)
1 In facial attributes classification, this measure also conforms to equality
of odds. E.g., if bias(θ,arched eyebrows) and bias(θ,no arched eyebrows)
are both small, then the probability that different genders are misclassified
is also equal.
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Figure 2: Model bias v.s. imbalanced data distribution. x-axis
denotes the female ratio of total people with certain facial
attribute in the training set, and y-axis denotes the model
bias over gender in predictions testing set.
where θ indicates the parameter of the examined classifier, tˆ ∈ T de-
notes the predicted target variable of classifier, t∗ ∈ T represents the
ground-truth target variable like arched eyebrow, and b represents
the bias variables such as gender, skin color. Smaller bias(θ , t)means
that the classifier tends not to be affected by the bias variables when
making predictions. The sum of the bias of all target variables to
measure the overall bias for model bias(θ ) = ∑t bias(θ , t).
Attribution in imbalanced data distribution. With the defini-
tion of model bias, we then use the CelebA dataset [17] to examine
its attribution in data distribution. Specifically, using the 34 facial
attributes 2. as target variables to predict and the gender as bias
variable, we trained facial attributes classifier and calculated their
corresponding gender bias according to Eqn. (1).
Figure 2 shows the calculated model bias (y-axis) for different fa-
cial attributes and their corresponding female training image ratio
(x-axis). It is easy to find the strong correlation between model bias
and imbalanced data distribution: for facial attributes with a larger
ratio of female in training set (> 0.5 in the x-axis), female images
are more easily correctly classified thanmale images, and vice versa
for male (< 0.5 in the x-axis). For example, there are more female
training images for facial attribute of “arched eyebrows”, and the
corresponding classifier is observed to derive more correct predic-
tion for female images, while male images with arched eyebrows are
likely to be incorrectly predicted. The observation suggests that the
classifier learns the correlation between facial attribute and gender
from the imbalanced data, and thus utilizes the gender bias variable
for target variable prediction. It well validates the motivation of the
previous debiasing attempts via pre-processing to balance training
data distribution, so that the learned model will not utilize the bias
variables for target task prediction.
2 Within the 40 annotated atttributes of CeleA, we waived the ones not
related to face (e.g., wearing hat) or essentially belonging to certain gender
(e.g., mustache). This leaves 18 attributes, among which the gender attribute
is selected as the bias variable. Regarding each of the remaining 17 facial
attributes, the bias data distribution is very different for sample sets w/ and
w/o this attribute. To facilitate data analysis and later experimental evalua-
tion, we consider each facial attribute in two target tasks (e.g., attribute of
arched eyebrow involve with two target variables of arched eyebrow and
non-arched eyebrow), which leads to finally 17 ∗ 2 = 34 target tasks.
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Figure 3: Gender classification accuracy for different train-
ing settings with switched labels.
2.2 The Potential of Adversarial Example in
Balancing Data Distribution
Feasibility of adversarial example for attack class training.
The above analysis attributes model bias to the imbalanced data
distribution over bias variables. However, with the training data
reflecting the real-world distribution, it is difficult to explicitly
collect more samples with minority-bias variables 3 (e.g., it is indeed
rare to see many males with “arched eyebrows”). Conventional
pre-processing debiasing solutions resort to down-sampling and
up-sampling [7, 15, 30], which either fails to make full use of the
training data or only guarantees superficial data balance.
It is observed from recent studies that adversarial examples con-
tain generalized features of the attack class [14], i.e., model trained
solely on adversarial examples with attack labels performs well on
unmodified real testing data. Inspired by this, we are interested
in employing adversarial attack to generate pseudo samples for
the minority-bias variables, e.g., with the target task of predicting
“arched eyebrows”, adversarial perturbation is added to attack fe-
male into male images. In this way, the generated pseudo samples
can be seen as augmented data for data distribution balancing and
thus contribute to model debiasing.
We conducted preliminary experiment to justify the feasibility
of adversarial examples in switching gender labels and generalizing
to original real samples. Specifically, we first trained binary gender
classifier дor i with original face images from the CelebA dataset,
and then employed I-FGSM [16] to attack each original image to its
adversarial image with opposite gender label. Denoting the original
image set as Xor i and the attacked adversarial image set as Xadv ,
we constructed the following two training datasets: (1) Hard switch:
original image set Xor i with manually switched gender labels 4;
(2) ADV switch: adversarial image set Xadv with attacked gender
labels 5.
We utilized the above two datasets to train gender classifiers
дhardswitch and д
ADV
switch respectively. Figure 3 (top 2 rows) shows their
classification accuracy on the original image testing set. It is easy
3 We use "minority-bias variable" to denote the value of bias variable with
less samples, e.g., male in gender bias.
4 E.g., training label is set as male if the ground-truth label is female.
5 E.g., if amale image is attacked as female, its training label is set as female.
to understand the extremely poor performance of дhardswitch as the
manually switched labels make the image-label correlation exactly
the opposite between the training and testing sets. While, by replac-
ing the original images with adversarial attacked images, gender
classification accuracy increases from 5.7% to 55.6%, verifying that
adversarial examples contain useful information about the attack
class and have potential to generalize to original real data.
Stronger adversarial examples contributing to improved at-
tack class training. However, the accuracy of 55.6% indicates
that the adversarial examples are still far from adequate to directly
replace real attack-class samples. Actually, studies have found that
the generalization of the adversarial example to attack class largely
depends on its attack strength [21]. That is, adversarial examples
fooling more classifiers likely to contain more generalized features
to attack class.
Following this spirit, we expect that a more robust bias classifier
can generate stronger adversarial examples generalizing well to
attack class. Therefore, we first conducted adversarial training on
дor i to improve its robustness and acquired the robust classifier
дrobust , and then employed I-FGSM to attack this robust classifier
дrobust to derive new training setADV switch (robust)with attacked
gender label. The learned gender classifier from this new training
set is denoted as дADV (robust )switch , whose classification accuracy is
shown in the bottom of Figure 3. The significant increase from
55.6% to 89.1% demonstrates the superior generalization potential
of adversarial examples from robust models, which motivates us
to design more robust bias classifiers in generating adversarial
examples for data augmentation.
2.3 Cross-task Transferability
The above analysis verifies that adversarial examples hold some
generalization to attack class in the task of bias classification. For
model debiasing, two tasks are involved, i.e., the bias task like
gender classification and the target task like “arched eyebrows”
prediction. Therefore, in addition to the adversarial generalization
within bias task, it is desirable the adversarial example maintains its
generalization ability to original real data during training the target
task. We refer the adversarial examples’ capability in maintaining
attack class information from bias tasks to target tasks as cross-task
transferability.
This subsection examines the cross-task transferability by uti-
lizing adversarial examples for data augmentation-based visual
debiasing. We first introduced one straightforward way: the de-
rived adversarial examples Xadv from the previous subsection
is added into the original training image set to train the target
facial attribute classifiers. Specifically, the resultant training set
Xauдment consists of Xadv and the original images, and the tar-
get classifier is realized with VGG-16 containing feature extractor
f (·) and classification module ht (·). To examine cross-task trans-
ferability, using target classifier’s feature extractor f (·), we trained
additional bias classification modulehb (·)дeneralize based onXadv
with attacked gender labels, and calculated the gender classification
accuracy of Xorд on bias classifier { f (·);hb (·)дeneralize }. Since
{ f (·);hb (·)дeneralize } shares the feature extractor f (·) for target
task prediction, if original image can be correctly classified by
this bias classifier, we consider Xadv contains information about
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Figure 4: Cross-task transferability of adversarial examples
during the training process of the target task classifier.
the attack class and possesses cross-task transferability to some
extent. To further track whether cross-task transferability is main-
tained during the training process, for every training epochm, we
repeated the following three operations: (1) using Xauдment to
update f (·)(m) and ht (·)(m) for target task; (2) fixing f (·)(m) and
using Xadv with attacked gender labels to update hb (·)(m)дeneralize
for bias task; (3) using { f (·)(m);hb (·)(m)дeneralize }to test Xorд and
calculating the generalization accuracy r (m). Figure 4 illustrates
the generalization accuracy (left y − axis) for every training epoch,
where ADV switch and ADV switch (robust) correspond to the re-
sults by using дor i and дrobust to generate adversarial examples
respectively. It is shown the adversarial examples generated from
дor i and дrobust both gradually lose cross-task transferability as
training proceeds. We explain the reason to yield this result as that:
under the optimization goal of minimizing target task loss, the
feature extractor f (·) tends to ignore the trivial difference between
original samples and adversarial examples (which hold different
bias label but with the same target task label) as training proceeds 6.
With almost the same features with original samples from f (·), the
{ f (·)(m);hb (·)(m)дeneralize } trained on Xadv largely fail to classify
original samples.
To demonstrate the influence of cross-task transferability to
model bias, we also calculated the gender bias of target task model
during training, which is illustrated in Figure 4with right y-axis. It is
shown that model bias generally increases as adversarial examples
lose their cross-task transferability. Combining with the above ex-
planation for the decreased generalization accuracy, we understand
the correlation between model bias and cross-task transferability
as that: when f (·) gradually derives almost the same features for
adversarial and original samples, the role of augmenting adversarial
examples reduces to replicating the original samples and derives
trivial effect in balancing data distribution. Therefore, adjusting the
generated adversarial examples to fit to the ever updating feature ex-
tractor and maintaining the cross-task transferability is critical for
adversarial example-based data augmentation for visual debiasing.
6 In Appendix A, we illustrate the feature difference between original sam-
ples and adversarial examples during training the target task.
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Figure 5: Illustration of adversarial perturbation in feature
space: (a) only considering the bias task (e.g., female/male);
(b) jointly considering the target task (e.g., “arched eyebrow”
prediction).
3 METHODOLOGY
3.1 Overview
We formally define visual debiasing problem as follows:
Definition 2 (Visual Debiasing). Given image data set Dor i =
{xi , ti ,bi }i=1:N , where xi ∈ Xor i denotes the ith image original
feature, ti ∈ T denotes its target task label, bi ∈ B denotes its bias
task label, visual debiasing aims to learn an unbiased target task
classifier with parameter θ satisfying that the prediction of target task
label tˆ is independent of the bias labels: P(tˆ = ti |b;θ ) = P(tˆ = ti ;θ ).
The above data analysis section justifies the attribution of model
bias from imbalanced data distribution and the potential of ad-
versarial example in balancing data distribution. Following these
observations, in this section, we propose the visual debiasing solu-
tion via Adversarial Example-based Data Augmentation (AEDA).
The direct way to realize AEDA is to separately generate adversarial
examples to balance data distribution as pre-processing and then
use the augmented dataset to train target task classifier. This leads
to the basic version of our solution, which we call AEDA_pre and
will be introduced in Section 3.2. To address the cross-task transfer-
ability issue, we propose to couple target task classifier training and
adversarial example generation, which we call AEDA_online and
will be introduced in Section 3.3. A complete version of our solution
called AEDA_robust is elaborated in Section 3.4 to further address
the adversarial generalization issue, where we conduct additional
adversarial training operation when updating the bias classifier to
improve the robustness.
3.2 AEDA_pre
In typical visual debiasing problems, among the training samples
with specific target task label t ∈ T, the ratio of samples with dif-
ferent bias labels b ∈ B is usually heavily imbalanced. For example,
regarding the classification of “arched eyebrows” in CelebA, the
ratio of samples with female gender to male gender is above 15 : 1.
To balance the data distribution for visual debiasing, the direct way
to realize AEDA consists of two steps: (1) Bias variable adversarial
attack, adding perturbation to the original sample xi ∈ Xor i to gen-
erate adversarial examples xadvi with the altered bias labelb
′
i . In this
way, adversarial attack supplements the shortage of minority-bias
variable samples (e.g., male “arched eyebrows” images) to construct
a balanced dataset Dauдment = {Dor i ; {xadvi , ti ,b
′
i }}. (2) Target
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Figure 6: Framework of AEDA_online and AEDA_robust. AEDA_robust contains additional adversarial training module (high-
lighted with red dashline) to AEDA_online.
task classifier training, using the balanced dataset Dauдment to
train an unbiased target task classifier.
Regarding the first step, using I-FGSM as the adversarial attack
method, we alter the bias label for the ith image as follows:
xadvi = argmin
xi
Lbias (xi ,battack ) (2)
where Lbias is the loss function of the bias classifier, battack is the
bias attack class. While standard adversarial attack changes the
bias label of original samples, the added adversarial perturbation
has risk to also affect the feature representation for target task
prediction. As shown in Figure 5(a), with the identified perturba-
tion direction n1 by only considering the bias classifier gradients,
adversarial perturbation is risky to also move across the target task
classification boundary. This tends to deteriorate the training of
target task classifier.
Therefore, we revise the adversarial attack step and require the
generated adversarial examples to also possess the following prop-
erty: the added adversarial perturbation should not affect the target
task variable of the original sample. To implement this, we modify
Eqn. (2) and generate adversarial examples as follows:
xadvi = argmin
xi
(
λLbias (xi ,battack ) + (1 − λ)Ltarдet (xi , t)
)
(3)
where Ltarдet is the loss function of the target task classifier 7, t
is target task label and λ is the weighting parameter controlling
the two terms. The added term plays role in preventing the target
task features from damaged by adversarial perturbation and thus
preserving the target task label. As shown in Figure 5(b), by jointly
considering the target task classifier, the identified perturbation
direction n2 is guaranteed to preserve the feature and label for
target task prediction.
3.3 AEDA_online
As observed in Section 2.3 that adversarial examples have poor
cross-task transferability and lose the attack class information when
training target task classifiers. This will lead to a “fake” balanced
7 A preliminary target task classifier needs to be learned first from the
original training set before adversarial data augmentation.
data distribution, which contributes little to data augmentation and
visual debiasing. To address this, instead of separating adversarial
attack and target task classifier training as inAEDA_pre, we propose
to couple these two steps by restricting the bias classifier utilizing
the feature extractor of target task classifier. As shown in Figure 6,
target task and bias task share the same feature extractor f (·), with
two additional classification modules ht (·) and hb (·) on top of f (·).
By attacking the coupled bias classifier { f (·);hb (·)}, the generated
examples are expected to deliver discriminative features from f (·)
and thus ensure cross-task transferability to the target task.
However, this one-time coupled adversarial attack can only guar-
antee cross-task transferability for few epoches. The observation in
Section 2.3 demonstrates that adversarial examples gradually lose
their attack information and fail to continuously balance the data
distribution during training of the target task classifier. To address
this, we design online coupled adversarial attack where target task
classifier and bias task classifier are simultaneously updated. Specif-
ically, the following three steps iterate during the training process
(at epochm):
• Target task classifier training:
min
f ,ht
Ltarget({Xor i , {X(m−1)adv }, t) (4)
• Bias task classifier training:
min
hb
Lbias (Xor i ,b; f (·)) (5)
• Adversarial attack: X(m)adv ← Xor i following Eqn. (3)
In this way, the adversarial examples are adaptively generated
based on the current target task feature extractor and thus guaran-
teed to well transfer to next epoch’s target task training.
3.4 AEDA_robust
Section 2.2 observes that the capability of adversarial examples to
generalize to attack class largely depends on the robustness of the
attack classifier to generate the adversarial examples. To improve
the adversarial generalization, based on AEDA_online, we further
introduce an adversarial training module when updating the bias
task classifier.
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As highlighted in red dashline of Figure 6, the generated adver-
sarial examples at previous epoch are employed in an adversarial
training setting towards robust bias classifier. Specifically, the train-
ing process is modified to iterate the following three steps:
• Target task classifier training: same as Eqn. (4);
• Robust bias task classifier training:
min
hb
Lbias ({Xor i ,X(m−1)adv },b; f (·)) (6)
• Adversarial attack: X(m)adv ← Xor i following Eqn. (3)
By iteratively optimizing between the above three steps, the gen-
erated adversarial examples are guaranteed to continuously hold
the generalization capability to bias attack class as well as main-
tain the cross-task transferability to target task. The optimization
ends when the training loss of target task converges. The derived
{ f (·);ht (·)} is the final taregt classifier expected to enjoy both high
target classification accuracy and low model bias.
4 EXPERIMENTS
4.1 Experiment Setup
We evaluated the proposed AEDA solution on both simulated and
real-world bias scenarios: (1) For the simulated bias, we used C-
MNIST dataset [18]. Its 10 handwritten digit classes (0-9) were
regarded as the target task variables, and the associated background
colors were regarded as the bias variable. When classifying digit
classes, the model may rely on the background color of image. The
goal is to remove the background color bias in digit recognition.
(2) For the real-world bias, we used the face dataset CelebA with
multiple facial attributes as the target task variables. The goal is to
remove the modelâĂŹs gender bias in facial attribute classification.
Baselines We consider several typical debiasing solutions for
comparison.
• Down-sampling: discarding samples with majority bias variable
to construct a balanced dataset before target task training [7, 30].
• Reweighting: assigning different weights to samples and mod-
ifying the training objectives to softly balance the data distribu-
tion [15].
• Adv debiasing: the typical in-processing debiasing solution by
adversarially learning between the target and bias tasks [4, 26].
The goal is to extract fair representation that contributes to the
target task but invalidates the bias task. We followed the previous
studies and implemented Adv debiasing using transfer reversing
gradient [11].
•CycleGAN: generating synthetic data by altering bias variables [31].
We implemented this to compare AEDA with the line of solutions
explicitly supplementing minority samples.
Evaluation metrics For target task performance, since the ex-
amined datasets involve with multi-label classification, we use bal-
anced average accuracy (bACC) for evaluation: bACC is defined as
the average accuracy of each group with different target variables
and bias variables. From a fairness perspective, the importance of
people with different bias variables is equal. An unbiased evaluation
of accuracy should assign the same weight to groups with different
bias variables. The higher the bACC, the more accurate the target
task classifier is. For the model bias bias(θ ), the lower the bias(θ ),
the more fair the model is.
◿
Training set
Testing set
0  1  2  3  4  5  6 7  8  9 
Figure 7: The training and testing setting of simulated debi-
asing.
Table 1: Performances comparison on the C-MNIST data set.
Methods bACC (%) Model bias
Original 55.62 7.84
Under-sampling [7, 30] – –
Reweighting [15] – –
Adv debiasing [4, 11, 26] 89.93 1.37
CycleGAN [31] 65.23 5.42
AEDA_pre 64.53 5.89
AEDA_online 80.57 3.20
AEDA_robust 91.80 0.53
4.2 Simulated Debiasing Evaluation
We modified the C-MNIST data set for background color debias-
ing performance evaluation. In the training data, digits 0∼4 are
associated with red background color, 5∼9 are associated with
brown background color, and other data are dropped. The data
with ⟨0 ∼ 9, red⟩ and ⟨0 ∼ 9,brown⟩ are both used for testing. The
modified training and testing settings are illustrated in Figure 7. It is
easy to see that the background color of the digits is the simulated
bias variable, which contains high-predictive information but are
actually independent of the target digit classes. With the testing
set as a fair distribution setting, we used it to evaluate the target
task accuracy and model bias.
The debiasing methods are to make the model independent of
the background color of the image in digit recognition. Table 1
summarizes the performance for different methods. It is shown that
with the very different distributions between training and testing
dataset, the Original classifier achieves a rather low bACC at 55.62%.
Moreover, since the modified C-MNIST training set is extremely
imbalanced with only one background color for each digit, it is
impossible to employ Down-sampling and Reweighting. Other main
observations include: (1) all the proposed three settings of AEDA
obtain superior bACC and model bias than that of Original. By
simultaneously robustly training the bias classifier and coupling it
with the target task classifier training, AEDA_robust demonstrates
the best performance over all baselines in both bACC and model
bias. (2) CycleGAN obtains similar performance with AEDA_pre,
showing very limited debiasing result due to the separation of
pseudo sample generation and target task training. (3)Adv debiasing
obtains noticeable improvement in both bACC and model bias. We
owe this result to the relative easy disentanglement between shape
and color in the C-MNIST dataset, where Adv debiasing manages
to extract fair representation focusing on shape feature and only
correlating to the target task.
Towards Accuracy-Fairness Paradox: Adversarial Example-based Data Augmentation for Visual Debiasing
Original
AEDA_
robust
◿
Figure 8: Digit classification confusion matrices for testing
subset of ⟨0 ∼ 9, red⟩ (left) and ⟨0 ∼ 9,brown⟩ (right).
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Figure 9: Example images of 5 facial attributes to be pre-
dicted. The CelebA data set also provides gender annotation
for each image.
To further evaluate the influence of training distribution on
model performance for different target task variables, we examined
the classification accuracy for each digit class on the ⟨0 ∼ 9, red⟩
and ⟨0 ∼ 9,brown⟩ testing subsets respectively. The results ob-
tained by Original and the proposed AEDA_robust are summa-
rized as confusion matrices in Figure 8. Observations include: (1)
The classification accuracy of Original is severely dependent on
the background color of the testing subset, while AEDA_robust
obtains consistent classification performance between the two sub-
sets. This coincides with the definition of model bias in Eqn. (1)
and validates the model debiasing effectiveness. (2) For Original
classifier, when the training and testing set have very different data
distributions (e.g., bottom-left for ⟨0 ∼ 9, red⟩ subset and upper-
right for ⟨0 ∼ 9,brown⟩ subset), the testing accuracy tends to be
very low. This also demonstrates that the imbalanced training data
distribution heavily influences not only the model bias but also the
target task performance.
4.3 Real-world Debiasing Evaluation
We evaluated the real-world gender debiasing performance on the
CelebA data set and used VGG-16 [23] as the backbone network.
The same 34 facial attributes are employed as the target tasks.
Example images of 5 facial attributes to be predicted are illustrated
in Figure 9. Moreover, in the original CelebA, different images of the
same person may appear in both training and testing set. To prevent
Table 2: Performances comparison on the CelebA data set.
Methods bACC (%) Model bias
Original 73.57 5.48
Under-sampling [7, 30] 66.35 2.35
Reweighting [15] 73.82 4.39
Adv debiasing [4, 11, 26] 72.82 4.23
CycleGAN [31] 73.65 4.75
AEDA_pre 73.68 5.23
AEDA_online 74.03 4.22
AEDA_robust 74.30 3.27
person-specific features contributing to facial attribute prediction,
we keep one image for each person in either training set or testing
set.
Table 2 summarizes the performance for different methods on
CelebA. All reported results are averaged from 5-fold cross valida-
tion. The consistent observations with the above simulated debi-
asing evaluation include: (1) Among the the three AEDA settings,
AEDA_robust performs best in both bACC and model bias. (2) Cy-
cleGAN demonstrates limited debiasing performance. New observa-
tions include: (1) Original has normal bACC at 73.57%. In this case,
instead of sacrificing accuracy for fairness, it is interesting to see
that the proposed AEDA solutions still obtain superior performance
than Original in both accuracy and fairness. In the next subsection,
we will discuss further the role of data augmentation-based solution
in improving accuracy as well as fairness. (2) Down-sampling and
Reweighting are valid to reduce the model bias for facial attribute
prediction, with Down-sampling obtaining remarkable debiasing
performance by explicitly balancing data distribution. However, by
discarding samples with majority-bias variable and employing a
fragmented training set,Down-sampling achieves a very poor target
task performance (bACC=66.35%). (3) Adv debiasing shows certain
debiasing performance, but not as good as that in the simulated eval-
uation. This difference is due to the complicated coupling between
the target and bias variables in real-world debiasing scenarios.
The necessity of online coupled adversarial attack. To fur-
ther understand themechanism of online coupled adversarial attack,
we reported more results by examining the training process. Re-
calling from Section 2.3, cross-task transferability is critical for
debiasing. Therefore, we first calculated the bias generalization
accuracy r (m) at each training epoch for the proposed AEDA solu-
tions, which is shown in Figure 10(a).WhileAEDA_pre shows rather
poor bias generalization accuracy, AEDA_online and AEDA_robust
demonstrate stable and superior capability in maintaining cross-
task transferability. To analyze the role of online continuous attack,
a fourth setting named AEDA_once is also implemented and com-
pared, which is similar to AEDA_online except with the difference
that adversarial examples Xadv are generated only once instead
of continuously updated during the training process. As shown in
Figure 10(a), although better thanAEDA_pre, the cross-task transfer-
ability of AEDA_once fails to retain as training proceeds, validating
the necessity for online coupled adversarial attack.
We then analyzed the influence of cross-task transferability to
model debiasing. Using AEDA_pre and AEDA_robust as examples,
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Figure 10: (a) Cross-task transferability during training the target task. (b) Model bias and cross-task transferability in
AEDA_pre and AEDA_robust. (c) The debiasing effectiveness and traget task accuracy for each examined facial attribute.
we examined both the bias generalization accuracy (right y-axis)
and the target model bias (left y-axis) in Figure 10(b). After around
15 training epochs, it is shown that the model bias of AEDA_robust
is stable at a relative low level (3.1). However, the model bias of
AEDA_pre continues to increase as its cross-task transferability
gradually loses, with a final model bias as high as 5.3. Moreover,
we modified the training process of AEDA_robust and examined
the changes of cross-task transferability and model bias when ter-
minating online update of adversarial example generation at 40th
epoch. Shown with green curves in Figure 10(b), the cross-task
transferability and model bias approach those of AEDA_pre after
40th epoch, further demonstrating the effectiveness of online cou-
pled adversarial attack in retaining cross-task transferability and
reducing model bias.
4.4 Discussion
4.4.1 The consistency between accuracy and fairness. In addition
to alleviating model bias, the proposed AEDA solution gives rise
to two interesting discussions. First discussion involves with the
accuracy-fairness paradox. It is recognized in conventional debi-
asing attempts [9, 10, 20, 29] that, there exists tradeoff between
accuracy and fairness and the goal is to reduce model bias under
the condition of equal, if not slightly decreased accuracy.
However, the results in both simulated and real-world debias-
ing evaluation demonstrate AEDA’s capability in simultaneously
improving model accuracy and fairness. In Figure 10(c), we show
the model bias and target task accuracy for each examined facial
attribute. Other than the consistently reduced model bias from Orig-
inal, it is interesting to find the close relation between distribution
balance, model bias and accuracy: the facial attributes with more
balanced data distribution tend to have lower model bias and higher
accuracy.
This inspires us to examine the common attributions of accuracy
and fairness to data distribution. By generating supplementary
samples to augment the training data, a balanced dataset contributes
to removing the erroneous dependence on bias variables and thus
making the inference of target tasks more dependent on intrinsic
features. Without discarding training data or adding constraints
to affecting target task learning, the proposed data augmentation-
based solution provides alternative perspective to address model
debiasing problem and validates the possibility to simultaneously
improving fairness and accuracy.
4.4.2 Adversarial attack-based pseudo sample generation. The pre-
vious study has discovered that human and model may rely on very
different features [14]. In the above experiments, we verified this in
the context of model debiasing tasks that model can extract useful
information from training samples that human hardly recognizes.
In most supervised learning scenarios, the main challenge is to
collect adequate samples recognizable from human’s perspective.
Without the restrictions of human recognition, adversarial attack
actually provides alternative solution to generate pseudo samples
and makes up for the common data shortage issues.
In this spirit, we examined the potential of adversarial attack-
generated samples in few shot learning. Specifically, the proposed
AEDA_robust is implemented and 4 way 4 shot experiment is con-
ducted in the C-MNIST dataset. A 27% average improvement is
obtained than Original, showing the feasibility of adversarial attack-
generated pseudo sample in addressing problems beyond debiasing.
Detailed experimental setting and results are provided in Appen-
dix B. Moreover, adversarial attack enjoys advantages that human
prior knowledge is readily to be incorporated to generate pseudo
samples with desired properties to increase sample diversity, which
also provides one practical way to consider human guidance in
regulating model learning.
5 CONCLUSION
In this work, we propose to balance data distribution via adding
supplementary adversarial example towards visual debiasing. The
proposed solution couples the operation of target task model train-
ing, bias task model training, and adversarial sample generation
in an online learning fashion. The experimental results in both
simulated and real-world debiasing evaluation demonstrates its
effectiveness in consistently improving fairness and accuracy. In
addition to study the common attribution behind fairness and ac-
curacy, it will also be interesting to employ adversarial example to
assist learning tasks other than model debiasing in the future.
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Appendix
In this supplementary document, we provide
• Appendix A: The difference in feature representation between
the original samples and the corresponding adversarial examples
illustrates the reason for the loss of cross-task transferability.
• Appendix B: We take few shot learning as example to show
adversarial attack-based pseudo samples’ ability to solve common
data shortage issues.
A THE REASON FOR DECREASED
CROSS-TASK TRANSFERABILITY
As mentioned in Section 2.3 of our main paper: For straightfor-
ward using the pre-generated adversarial examples set ADV switch
to augment training set, we consider that under the optimization
goal of minimizing target task loss, the feature extractor f (·) tends
to ignore the trivial difference between original samples and cor-
responding adversarial examples (which hold different bias label
but with the same target task label). With almost the same fea-
tures with original samples from f (·), adversarial examples fail to
continuously contain the bias information opposite to the original
samples.
In order to observe the change of deep feature difference between
original sample and adversarial example as training proceeds of
the target task, we calculated the feature difference between deep
representation of original sample and adversarial example extracted
by f (·) as follows:
∥ f (xi ) − f (xadvi )∥1
∥ f (xi )∥1 (7)
where ∥ f (xi )∥1 is the normalization term. The lower the feature
difference, the more similar the features of the adversarial example
and the original sample derived by f (·).
The changes of feature difference obtained by ADV switch and
AEDA_online are summarized in Figure 11. It is shown that our
AEDA_online has stable feature difference between original sam-
ples and adversarial examples, and the feature difference of ADV
switch gradually reduces during training proceeds. In ADV switch,
when f (·) gradually derives almost the same features for adver-
sarial and original samples, the role of augmenting adversarial
examples reduces to replicating the original samples and derives no
effect in balancing data distribution. This explains why ADV switch
gradually loses cross-task transferability during training proceeds
and has no effect in model debiasing. The stable feature difference
in AEDA_online indicates that it is necessary to build an online
coupled adversarial attack mechanism to derive nontrivial feature
difference between f (xi ) and f (xadvi ).
B ADVERSARIAL ATTACK-BASED PSEUDO
SAMPLE GENERATION FOR FEW SHOT
LEARNING
In the experiments of our main paper, we verified this in the context
of model debiasing tasks that model can extract useful information
from training samples that human hardly recognizes. And in most
supervised learning scenarios, the main challenge is to collect ade-
quate samples recognizable from human’s perspective. Without the
Figure 11: The mean feature difference between original
samples and corresponding adversarial examples extracted
by f (·) as training proceeds of the target task classifier.
Table 3: The comparison of precision (%) in few-shot learn-
ing (taking 4-way 4-shot results as example).
digit
Methods 2 4 6 8
Original 46.80 70.37 0.00 0.00
AEDA_robust 69.25 88.88 42.50 25.00
restrictions of human recognition, adversarial attack can be used
to generate useful pseudo samples and make up for the common
data shortage issues. In this section, we take few shot learning as
example to show adversarial attack-based pseudo samples’ ability
to solve common data shortage issues.
We retained the C-MNIST experimental settings in our main pa-
per, set the digits 2, 4, 6, and 8 to the few shot classes, and conducted
a 4 way 4 shot experiment. For adversarial attack-based pseudo
sample generation, we simultaneously used adversarial attacks to
extract generalized intra-class variations and inter-class variations
of digits, and applied the variations to effectively synthesize pseudo
samples for increasing sample diversity of few shot classes. Ad-
versarial attack enjoys advantages that human prior knowledge is
readily to be incorporated to generate pseudo samples with desired
variations to regulate the model learning.
The results obtained by Original and the proposed AEDA_robust
are summarized in Table 3. Compared with theOriginal method, the
proposed AEDA_robust significantly improves the accuracy of few
shot classes (a 27% average improvement). Although AEDA_robust
has not been specifically modified for few shot learning and may
not be the best performance in the field of few shot learning, the im-
provement in accuracy still demonstrates the ability ofAEDA_robust
to indirectly control model by generating pseudo samples with de-
sired properties.
